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Description
Before man was exchanging goods and ideas, he was exchanging germs. As such, the spread of infectious
disease constitutes the first truly global phenomenon and, therefore, marks the beginnings—primitive though
they may have been—of what today we have finally termed ‘globalization.’ The global spread of disease, then,
proves that globalization is not new and that its origins were the result of a different narrative than the ones we
read from globalization theorists; it further demonstrates that the modern conception of the phenomenon is
only now so well recognized because the accelerated and efficient processes that inform its daily activities have
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 In 1976 a novel virus appeared in Zaire.  In a region traditionally afflicted by the 
maladies of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, typhus, yellow fever, and Lassa virus, the 
initial cases of strange hemorrhagic fever raised no immediate alarms, author of Spillover and 
field writer/researcher for National Geographic, David Quammen noted (Quammen 69).    
Mankind’s ever-expanding geographic sprawl, indeed, has pushed the boundaries of the known 
world since the beginnings of our evolution; we were, as a species, born into wanderlust.  This 
continual encroachment into the unknown has brought us, inevitably, into contact with untold 
numbers of infectious microbes.  The sudden emergence of the hemorrhagic fever in central 
Africa was therefore not, in the abstract, something that human society had never seen before. 
 The novel virus was analyzed in CDC labs far from Africa and named for the river Ebola, 
where the first known cases had originated.  It soon appeared in other African states—Kenya, 
Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Quammen 117-118)—and was even reported, albeit 
in laboratory settings, in then-Communist-controlled Russia and the United States (Quammen 
100-104).  Ebola remains an elusive pathogen: there is no vaccine, there is no cure.  Researchers 
and medical experts alike still do not know where the virus hides in nature.  Yet, “disease 
patterns” have always been defined in terms of “roving parasites and opportunistic microbes” 
(Barnes 33).  This passage in Ethne Barnes’ work, Diseases and Human Evolution, speaks to the 
nature of the relationship between microbes and human beings.  The brief excerpt suggests that 
the history of interaction between both groups has largely been the result of infectious pathogens 
making the most of advantageous situations in which to jump from one animal species to another 
(i.e. humans) or to cross from one human population to another.  Such “opportunistic behavior” 
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has helped pathogens emerge from obscurity in animal reservoirs1 to reach endemic prevalence 
in human societies.  The Ebola virus appears to be no exception.  Since February 2014, a new 
outbreak has cut swaths through villages in Guinea—the first time the virus has ever appeared in 
that region, has reached Conakry, the capital city—the first time the virus has crept beyond the 
edges of the wilderness to a highly populated area, and has spread to neighboring Liberia, killing 
over 142 people as of the time of this writing (Falco).     
 The relatively recent emergence of this pathogen is not unique; instead, it is illustrative of 
a larger trend of humankind’s history with microbes.  In the current era of globalization, 
acceleration is among the most salient characteristics of the phenomenon; Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen, author of Globalization: The Key Concepts, writes about the theme of a world on fast-
forward: “everything,” he says, “happens faster and faster, bringing disparate parts of the world 
closer to each other” (Eriksen 34).  Every infectious pathogen requires hosts to survive, as such, 
the accelerated interconnectedness that modern globalization entails is ideal for microbial self-
preservation because it increases opportunities to find new hosts.  In transitioning from hunting 
and gathering to animal husbandry and agricultural practices, the changes in our “behavior 
toward the environment” have irrevocably “altered disease patterns” (Barnes 51).  Microbes, 
given this perspective, have followed our evolutionary footsteps very closely since the 
beginnings of civilization.  The new pattern of accelerated globalization has, therefore, merely 
raised our consciousness of the globalization phenomenon that is, in actuality, very old.  Laurie 
Garrett, author of The Coming Plague, fellow at Harvard’s School of Public Health, and Pulitzer 
Prize winner for her reports on the Ebola Virus, echoes that the “catastrophic epidemic events in 
human history [are] the ironic result of humanity’s steps forward” (Garrett 6).  As the human 
                                                          
1 Usually a living being that an infectious microbe can reside within, causing limited harm to it, until an opportunity 
to move to a different host arises.     
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population expands beyond seven billion, humankind is increasingly moving into areas 
previously uninhabited and venturing into habitats never before disturbed.  In his work, Plagues 
in World History, John Aberth—academic dean at Castleton State College and professor of 
history—alludes to this “density-dependent” (Alberth 2) factor in disease propagation.  This 
means that the prerequisite for microbial proliferation relies on the reproductive success and 
geographical dissemination of host bodies—Homo sapiens in this case.  In order not to 
“consume…its opportunities among susceptible hosts,” writes David Quammen, “there’s a 
critical minimum size of the host population, below which [an infectious pathogen] can’t persist 
indefinitely as an endemic, circulating infection.  This is known as the critical community size 
(CCS)” (Quammen 129).  Density-dependent infectious agents, then, can only survive given a 
proper critical community size.  As human societies have grown, many populations now exceed 
their CCS by generous margins, allowing more rapid disease transmission.  Novel, zoonotic 
diseases—those diseases passed from animals to humans—have become endemic in human 
populations by this same process throughout our history; all that has changed is the alarming 
pace with which infectious microbes now jump from their animal reservoirs to human hosts.  In 
the time frame spanning from 1940 to 2004, a study examined 335 disease events that revealed 
“60 percent of these events were related to zoonoses” and that in 132 countries, during just a 
three year time frame (1998-2001), 578 disease outbreaks occurred (Skolnik 242-243). By the 
same token, the globalizing processes that brought about disease spread among human societies 
is as old as our first contact with animals carrying zoonotic pathogens.  Globalization, a result of 
the ever-greater spread of humankind, is inseparable from our relationship with infectious 
pathogens.   
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 Globalization is a phenomenon that had its beginnings in human activity.  It is today 
understood to encompass such a volume of processes, meanings, ideologies, and interactions that 
the phenomenon is difficult to concisely define.  That is not to say, however, that there have not 
been many laudable attempts to do just that.  Manfred Steger introduced the word “globality” as 
a substitute for globalization, meaning it to represent the phenomenon as a condition rather than 
as a process; he took it to mean “a social condition characterized by tight global economic, 
political, cultural, and environmental interconnections…[making] borders and boundaries 
irrelevant” (Steger 8).  Social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen and sociologist Anthony 
Giddens both allude to the “complex set of processes” that comprise globalization and how such 
processes “operate in a contradictory or oppositional fashion” (Giddens 13) and how 
globalization is “not a unidirectional process” (Eriksen 9).  Amartya Sen, an economist, views 
globalization as contributing to the developments and advancements of human society “through 
travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences, and dissemination of knowledge and 
understanding” (Sen 16).  Anthropologist Angelique Haugerud offers her sense of globalization 
as referring to “accelerated flows or intensified connections—across national and other 
boundaries—of commodities, people, symbols, technology, images, information, and capital” 
(Haugerud 104).  Sociologist John Urry, author of Globalization and Citizenship, identifies 
globalization processes, rather tautologically, as being “non-coterminous with the boundaries of 
nation-states” (Urry 315) and defines it by one of its most important consequences: the decline of 
the nation-state and dissolution of citizenship, which are themes echoed by Susan Strange in The 
Declining Authority of States.  The struggle to define the processes of social, political, economic, 
and cultural interconnectedness that have reached a global scale attests to the complex nature of 
globalization and why its origins and implications are contested.       
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 Of course there are many other social scientists, popular authors, and theorists—among 
others—that have advanced their own theses grappling with the globalization phenomenon, but 
the small selection above should offer at least introductory insight into the scholarship of 
globalization.  Common themes raised both by the social scientists and authors from other 
academic disciplines were the acceleration of global interconnectedness, the complexity and 
multidirectional nature of globalization, and its ability to make geo-political boundaries 
irrelevant.  While the worldwide processes that constitute globalization link human societies to 
one another by the activities in which they participate, disease links human societies across the 
globe to one another and similarly links humankind to the environment and animals which 
surround us.  After all, at a biological level, “infectious disease is a mortar, binding one creature 
to another” (Quammen 20).  Notably, within this discussion of globalization, not all of the 
sources recognize global disease as being among of one of the most important consequences of a 
shrinking world.  And, interestingly, those sources that do contain reference to global disease 
often fold the phenomenon into an existing conceptual discussion rather than introduce human 
disease as a standalone topic.  In Eriksen’s work, for example, besides a paragraph about the 
Black Death along with fleeting references to HIV/AIDS, SARS, and unspecified global disease, 
his discussion on vulnerability (in the 2007 edition)2 has no dedicated section to pandemics or 
disease, but rather addresses other vulnerabilities at length, such as the contemporary threat of 
terrorism, instead.  In further examples, John Urry does address global disease, but does so 
almost dismissively in just a single bullet point among a list of 17 other emerging global 
concerns.  Angelique Haugerud vaguely mentions “declining living standards” and the 
“curtailment of social expenditures” (Haugerud 104) as important issues overlooked by popular 
                                                          
2 In the 2014 edition of Globalization: The Key Concepts, there is an entire section dedicated to “The AIDS Epidemic 
and Globalization.”   
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writer Thomas Friedman in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree; while these references could 
be proxies for assessing global disease, Haugerud fails to elaborate on it or mention disease 
specifically anywhere else in her critique.  While the definitions of globalization may vary in 
their nuanced interpretations, there seem to be prominent characteristics representative of the 
wider scholarship on the topic—global disease, nevertheless, does not seem to earn the attention 
it merits as a global phenomenon.   
 Before humankind was exchanging goods and ideas, we were exchanging germs.  As 
such, the spread of infectious disease may very well constitute the first truly global phenomenon 
thereby marking the beginnings—primitive though they may have been—of what today we have 
finally termed ‘globalization’.  From the outbreaks of bubonic plague that afflicted Ancient 
Greece, the Roman Empire, and Western Europe to the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 1918 and 
toward contemporary experiences of contagion, our human-driven dissemination of disease and 
the reaction to it by nations and peoples over the course of history demonstrates our awareness of 
its important global implications.  The global spread of disease, then, strongly suggests that 
globalization is not new, that our contemporary consciousness of its existence is merely 
heightened, and that its origins were the result of our earliest interactions with our environments, 
making it a different narrative than what other globalization theories intend to convey.   
THE LEGACY OF GLOBALIZATION AND DISEASE  
 Finding evidence for globalization’s beginnings is perhaps just as difficult as defining the 
phenomenon itself.  It has been acknowledged that, lexically, the term is indisputably new 
(Rantanen 64), arising only around the time of the 1980s (Giddens 8).  Since that time, its 
various political, social, economic, and cultural manifestations have been the focus of inquiry 
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and debate.  Certainly during no other time in recorded history has humankind been so hyper-
connected; the latter 20th and beginnings of the 21st century have been characterized by 
interconnectedness that is, unlike transcontinental/transoceanic human relationships at any time 
in our past, instantaneous.  This simultaneity has intensified interactions and linked human 
societies in more profound and meaningful ways across the globe.  Giddens admitted to Terhi 
Rantanen in an interview that he began using the “G-word”—globalization—when he “felt that 
the existing words were not dealing with the issues properly,” as, for him, it was “really kind of 
development of the modern” (Rantanen 64).  Indeed, Giddens claims in his work that 
globalization, as a conjunction of political, technological, cultural and economic phenomena, 
“has been influenced above all by developments in systems of communication, dating back only 
to the late 1960s” such that “globalization, as we are experiencing it, is in many respects not only 
new but revolutionary” (Giddens 10).  Interestingly, Thomas Eriksen says both that the notion 
that globalization began in the 1980s “betrays the beholder’s poor knowledge of history” yet 
claims, simultaneously, that, in a cultural sense, “globalization is recent” and “as a form of 
consciousness, [it] is new as a mass phenomenon” (Eriksen 5).  Eriksen’s stated caveat speaks to 
the complexity of globalization and the difficulty that arises in trying to orient its beginnings 
chronologically.  Both Eriksen and Giddens allude to globalization as a recent occurrence, borne 
out of accelerated interconnectedness, deterritorialization, and technology, but they both qualify 
the implications of their assertions; in other words, Eriksen claims that globalization is new 
given a cultural lens or understood as arising from our own consciousness of its existence while 
Giddens insists that it is a new phenomenon only insofar “as we are [currently] experiencing it.”  
These subtle disclaimers would appear to suggest that Eriksen and Giddens recognize that 
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globalization cannot be entirely new; another camp of authors, social scientists, and globalization 
theorists argues just this. 
 The position that holds globalization to be “a long-term process” (Steger 19) cite various 
reasons justifying the existence of globalization throughout history.  Eriksen mentions the “time-
space compression” (Eriksen 35)—a term he borrowed from geographer David Harvey—as 
integral to the globalization process and the importance of this is not lost on those who seek to 
refute the notion of globalization as new occurrence.  Prominent economist Amartya Sen claims 
that “over thousands of year, globalization has contributed to the progress of the world through 
travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences, and dissemination of knowledge and 
understanding” (Sen 16), Roland Robertson, sociologist and theorist of globalization, highlights 
“four major focal points of the dominant globalization processes since the sixteenth century” and 
underscores the time-space compression to which Eriksen makes reference in what he calls “the 
take-off period of modern globalization…from 1870…to the mid-1920s” (Robertson 93), and 
Manfred Steger claims that the process of globalization has “over many centuries…crossed 
distinct qualitative thresholds” (Steger 19).  While each of these theorists avoids placing 
globalization within an overtly-specific time frame, they all, nonetheless, allude to its old roots.  
Globalization, for these authors, arose from the past and the view that understands such a process 
as new is a “misdiagnosis” of a phenomenon that is “neither new nor necessarily,” as Giddens 
would believe, “Western” (Sen 16-17).  According to Jan Aart Scholte, professor of international 
studies at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, however, “both of these perspectives are 
flawed.  The ‘all-change’ thesis” or that globalization is new, “suffers from historical myopia.  
The ‘all-continuity’ thesis,” that holds globalization to be an ancient phenomenon, “suffers from 
insensitivity to proportion” (Scholte 62).  Scholte believes globalization to have arisen in 
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primitive form as a result of “global consciousness” borne “half a millennium ago” (Scholte 62).  
Perhaps, then, globalization may be a function of human consciousness, such that without our 
recognition of its occurrence, globalization could not exist.  As Eriksen indicated earlier and as 
Robertson affirms: “the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson 88) 
in recent decades may be responsible for the inclination to identify globalization as new.  Yet no 
global phenomenon throughout the millennia of human existence has exhibited greater capacity 
for rousing human consciousness toward global awareness than disease.    
 Global disease is one of, if not the most important consideration in globalization.  An 
unhealthy population cannot attend school regularly, work consistently, or live sustainably.  Any 
economy operating given such a reality would not function properly and no government could 
long endure without a working economy.  Disease has the capacity to unravel the very fabrics of 
global exchange and cripple its infrastructure; globalization, then, like any other man-made 
institution, is at the mercy of disease.  Though some—such as Giddens and Eriksen, as noted 
above—maintain that the globalization phenomenon is novel in human experience, the pattern of 
communicable disease proliferation from early history up until the modern era demonstrates that 
contagious pathogens and our reactions to them were the first activities and behaviors that were 
shared by all people.  While populations from distinct cultural traditions may respond differently 
to the exact same diseases, the important part is that they react to disease and are thereby united 
in this reaction.  Whether this reaction constitutes ‘coming to peace’ with the presence of illness 
(as often happens when one ascribes physical ailment to the will of divinity) or arises out of a 
desire to fight against it—all societies have encountered and reacted accordingly to 
communicable disease since the beginnings of recorded history.  
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 Thomas Eriksen’s work highlights several concepts that draw attention to the concerns of 
contemporary globalization.  To illustrate the accelerated nature of globalization today, he recalls 
the example of the “ILOVEYOU” (Eriksen 33) virus—a virus for computers.  Because of the 
‘contagiousness’ with which certain malicious computer programs can ‘infect’ an otherwise 
‘healthy’ computer, we have termed such programs ‘viruses,’ which ostensibly parallels our 
experiences with biological infectious agents.  Eriksen, by highlighting computer viruses as a 
uniquely 21st century version of a viral pandemic, allegorizes the time-tested battle between 
human societies and infectious microbes.  Yet, as previously mentioned, biological microbes are 
not the focus of any specific subsection in Eriksen’s work.  Human disease perhaps escaped this 
analysis because it is such an embedded facet of the human experience that we pay it little heed 
when it is not immediately threatening; this leaves one to ponder why pandemics appear as 
prevalent topics in science fiction.  One possible explanation might be the ability of global 
disease to instill wonder and fear, without threatening immediacy; that is to say that the last truly 
devastating worldwide pandemic was almost 100 years ago, and all would-be pandemics in the 
post-modern age—SARS, Swine Flu, Bird Flu, and, to some extent, HIV/AIDS—have either 
been snuffed out by proactive public health measures (Skolnik 242) or have otherwise been 
contained from surreptitiously spreading to unknowing patients, as in the case of the 
education/prevention programs of HIV/AIDS.  In the 21st century, more modern globalization-
borne threats, such as terrorism and climate change, have incrementally overshadowed the threat 
of disease.  Eriksen’s analysis, then, raises the issue of globalization-associated vulnerability, 
which is perceived more acutely in the modern age as a result of our increased awareness of 
global interconnectedness.    
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 Several other authors reference the concept of global risk, a condition synonymous with 
vulnerability, as being a central tenet of globalization processes.  John Urry enumerates some of 
the implications of globalization, wherein he highlights the “breaking down of the coherence of 
national economies” (Urry 316) as a principal result of globalization.  Furthermore, Urry 
identifies the “collapse of power of the national society through the development of apparently 
new global risks” of which he names “the development of diseases carried across national 
borders by travelers” (Urry 316) as an example of globalization’s consequences. Here, Urry 
seems to imply that the risks we perceive in a globalized society are blamed on the accelerated 
processes of interconnectedness that we observe in contemporary life (as evidenced by his choice 
of words: “apparently new”).  He appears to argue that the risks to which he makes reference 
stem from deeper historical precedents and, indeed, may have been around for much longer than 
a post-modern interpretation of globalization might lead one to believe. Anthony Giddens, in 
Runaway World, concurs with Urry, despite his stated belief that globalization is a novel 
phenomenon in the human experience, claiming that “the idea of risk appears to have taken hold 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (Giddens 21).  He further elaborates on the 
“manufactured risk” (Giddens 28) that globalization entails.  His definition of this concept—as 
“risk created by the very impact of our developing knowledge upon the world…[such as] a 
stored up disaster to health” (Giddens 26)—resonates with Ethne Barnes’ earlier-cited 
commentary on the evolution of disease patterns.  Barnes, a paleopathologist, and Giddens, a 
sociologist, come to the same conclusion in their respective works: global activity of mankind 
has instigated contact with disease.  Eriksen, in undertaking Giddens’ notion of manufactured 
risks, similarly concludes that “the high population densities of cities makes [sic] it easy for 
disease to spread” (Eriksen 125).  These sparse references, however, are among the only 
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allusions to global disease in the works by the respective authors and yet they, as noted 
previously, function simply as anecdotal case-in-point justifications for broader arguments.     
 Globalization, given this view, seems to have heightened our perception of risk.  Yet, this 
feeling of vulnerability is not new.  Disease has always been framed by a narrative of dread.  
Philip Alcabes, director of the Public Health program at Adelphi University and author of Dread, 
claims that hysteria about a disease can, itself, be independent of any actual disease outbreak 
(Alcabes 223).  Disease, since the early history of international relations, has dictated state policy 
by means of an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy.  The comprehension of risk in the advent of the 
Europe’s Black Plague outbreak led governments to enact a variety of protectionist measures at 
the expense of rejecting all things foreign for the sake of domestic health interests.  Nations 
formed “health cliques” (Harrison 31), or primitive health and sanitation boards, where 
information was gathered by “network correspondents across Europe” (Harrison 19) on the 
health status of other countries as part of an increasing international awareness of the 
epidemiological interconnectedness created by cross-country trade.  This practice has been 
maintained, with a slight shift in emphasis, as a cornerstone of international policy ever since: 
“there is a…focus,” in 21st century politics, “on surveillance and communication in order to fight 
new outbreaks before they can become pandemics” (Youngerman 209). Given chronological 
anecdotes that span over 2,500 years—since the first recorded plague in Ancient Greece during 
the Peloponnesian Wars of 430BC to the modern pandemics of novel influenza viruses and 
HIV/AIDS—it, perhaps, seems apparent that as global transport and travel became more 
modernized, the human race has become ever more susceptible to the diseases of the globe. 
 In terms of disease, modern globalization has not heightened our risk, but, rather, has 
contextualized it.  While it is important to note that “many different forms of vulnerability have 
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been globalized” (Eriksen 125), this “fear that modernity has heightened our vulnerability” 
(Alcabes 217) is not entirely well-founded.  Though it is true that the post-modern advent of 
technology and global trade/travel has accelerated certain processes, human disease and illness 
have been around as long as humankind (Aberth 2).  Perhaps this is why, as Eriksen stipulated in 
his section on vulnerability, we prioritize relatively new global risks of terrorism and climate 
change over the danger of a pandemic.  Disease, Mark Harrison writes, is an “aspect of human 
history which is too often neglected” (Harrison xiv).  The legacy of the Spanish Flu, for example, 
was all but lost to history in the decades following its sudden abatement in the late winter of 
1919 (Davis 19).  Human disease, as experienced from our earliest history through epidemics 
and pandemics, has imprinted a sense of vulnerability on the psyche of human societies across 
the globe which has manifested in varying reactions to its specter.  This consciousness has 
roused our awareness of the threat posed by disease and has framed our understanding of an 
increasingly globalized human experience—beginning in ancient times.    
DISEASE AND EARLY GLOBALIZATION  
 Recorded history only details a fraction of Homo sapiens’ existence on the planet.  While 
diseases can sometimes leave lingering clues on bones as evidence of their presence—such as the 
marks of smallpox and polio on the preserved skeletons of Egyptian mummies (Aberth 4)—it is 
otherwise difficult to discern what diseases may have affected mankind during different episodes 
of history (Youngerman 200).  That said, just as Robertson delineated a brief history of 
globalization according to its “major focal points” and “take-off period[s]” (Robertson 93), so 
too does the global narrative of human disease lend itself well to specific periods in history when 
disease heightened our perception of the “time-space compression” (Erisksen 35) phenomenon 
that has characterized the globalization of our contemporary world.  Beginning with epidemics of 
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bubonic and pneumonic plague in the earliest recorded accounts of disease, the potential of 
disease to affect populations on a global scale was first recognized. After the Middle Ages, 
beginning with the explosion of maritime exploration, global horizons expanded substantially 
and the potential for globalized disease transmission was reinforced in the exchange of diseases 
between the New World and the Old World, in an event known as the Columbian Exchange.  At 
the turn of the 20th century, as global connectivity began to proliferate, a war initially confined to 
Western Europe reached a worldwide scale; as a consequence of the rapid increase in global 
travel, an opportunistic outbreak of influenza ravaged the world population.  Each of these 
provides evidence for the contention that disease is a global phenomenon and that globalization 
itself is largely a conception rooted in our consciousness of it.  
 Epidemics of plague have tormented human populations throughout history and across 
the globe.  Around 430BC, the Athenian chronicler Thucydides observed what has since become 
known as the Plague or Epidemic of Athens.  In Barry Youngerman’s Pandemics and Global 
Health, a compilation of primary source documents, he cites Thucydides as he recounts the 
Lacedaemonians invading Attica and spreading an unknown disease, supposed to have originated 
in northern Africa (Youngerman 195).  John Aberth, in tracing the important causes and 
consequences of global disease throughout history, also cites Thucydides’ text as comprehending 
the Athenian Plague to be “worldwide in its scope…it started in Ethiopia,” he recalled, “and 
progressed from there northward and westward…and eastward to the Persian Empire” (Aberth 
8).  According to Thucydides’ description, the epidemic stretched from Northern Africa, through 
Greece, and into the eastern domains of Mesopotamia.  It is believed that this pestilence, as 
described by Thucydides, was the black plague.   
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 Another plague-like illness was also described in accounts of the Plague of Justinian, 
occurring in 541-544AD.  Notably, the pestilence during this era was documented by Procopius 
of Caesarea, a prominent scholar and historian of the battles of Emperor Justinian.  He claimed 
that “the whole human race came near to being annihilated” (Procopius); in actuality, the 
plague—albeit devastating—only encompassed the Mediterranean, Western Europe, and parts of 
the Byzantine Empire.  For Mark Harrison, Director of the History of Medicine at Oxford, this 
instance of contagion constituted “the first pandemic in which trade played a major role” 
(Harrison xiv).  Emperor Justinian, envisioning a return to the glory days of the Roman Empire, 
sought to conquer all of the territories of the Mediterranean.  But a virulent microorganism, 
believed to have been the bubonic plague, just as in the Plague of Athens, ravaged the dominions 
of his empire, crippling his designs.   
 In the 14th century, as Western society clambered out of the Dark Ages and as lucrative 
trade between Europe and Asia intensified, Yersinia pestis appeared again on the international 
stage.  Returning to the continent almost 900 years since its last appearance—this time coming 
from Asia—the bubonic plague appeared first in Italy before making its way across Europe.  
Barry Youngerman terms the occurrence of plague in the 14th century “a pandemic [which] 
spread throughout the civilized world…probably a combination of bubonic and pneumonic 
plague” (Youngerman 197).  The plague’s ravages left millions of dead in its wake such that a 
third of the European population would die and “it would take 150 years for Europe’s population 
to return to its former size” (Sherman 69).  Part of the horror of the Black Death—another name 
for plague—was its ubiquity.  Ibn Khaldoun, a witness to the plague in Florence, wrote that 
“civilization decreased with the decrease of mankind” as the plague seemed to affect “the entire 
inhabited world” (Youngerman 198).  These epidemics of plague tormented early human 
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societies during very different time periods, yet all were characterized by an acute awareness of 
globalization.     
 The discussion of plague in the accounts of Thucydides, Procopius, and Khaldoun, taken 
together with Youngerman’s perspective, raise interesting points with regard to the globalization 
of disease.  At an implicit level of analysis, Youngerman’s syntax—i.e. his choice of the words 
“civilized world”—seem to posit globalization as a phenomenon only among civilized culture.  
Khaldoun’s commentary seems to reinforce this; whether intentionally as hyperbolic as 
Thucydides and Procopius was or otherwise ignorant, Khaldoun’s assertion that “the entire 
inhabited world” was affected by plague nevertheless speaks to the geographic understanding of 
globalization that likely prevailed during the time.  Procopius’ point of view, maintaining that the 
bacteria “spread over the whole world” (Procopius), echoes the distorted geographic 
understandings of Thucydides and Khaldoun, and vice versa, despite their accounts each being 
separated by nearly 1,000 years.  Taken as a group, these evaluations of the plague suggest that it 
has been interpreted and understood—both during ancient times up through the 14th century and 
toward modern times—as globalized, regardless of its true geographical distribution.  Though 
lexical innovation had not created the word ‘globalization’ by the 14th century, contemporary and 
historical accounts, from the Plague of Athens, through the Plague of Justinian, to the Black 
Plague, demonstrate that the Y. pestis disease was undoubtedly a facet of early globalization.      
 At the end of the following century, the next epidemiological shift came with 
transoceanic exploration.  In 1492, the Castilian monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella defeated the 
remaining Arab stronghold in the country in al Andalucía, ending an occupation that had lasted 
since 711AD (O'Callaghan 669).  In that same year, a Genoese man by the name of Christopher 
Columbus sought financial assistance to find an oceanic route to East Asia.  Instead, Columbus 
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stumbled upon the American continents and, unwittingly, set in motion a swapping of germs 
between previously separated populations—a momentous epidemiological incident known as the 
‘Columbian Exchange.’  The Columbian Exchange introduced the ravaging diseases of the Old 
World, namely smallpox, measles, typhus, and cholera, into Native American populations while 
it resulted in the transmission of syphilis eastward back to Europe (Harrison 17).  The 
consequences of these diseases were profound—resulting in the destruction of previously 
powerful Mesoamerican empires such as the Inca and Aztec.  The Old World diseases are 
estimated to have “caused devastation far exceeding that of even the Black Death” (Nunn 164).  
This interaction between previously separated continents also resulted in worldwide 
consequences: “the effects of the Columbian Exchange were not isolated to the parts of the world 
most directly participating in the exchange: Europe and the Americas…Africa and Asia” (Nunn 
164) were also involved.  In this instance, global exploration and transoceanic transmission of 
disease heightened awareness both of a shrinking world and of the increasing interconnectedness 
of peoples in different areas of the globe, thereby fueling the globalization phenomenon.  
 In 1918, the world was entering its fourth year of mechanized total war.  No war had 
mobilized so many of Europe’s armies since the days of Napoleon and no war had ever before 
reached a global scale.  Western Europe was cut with deep scars in the earth where trenches 
snaked across the hallowed deserts of mud, barbed wire, and uncollected corpses.  As the spring 
approached, the death toll was approaching perhaps as many as 10 million people (Crosby 11).  
The German High Command issued their Spring Offensive as a last-gasp hope to overrun the 
allied forces before the United States sent troops overseas.  In the beginning, the plan worked.  
Territory that had been the site of stalemates for years was now won by leaps-and-bounds in a 
matter of weeks (Churchill 824).  Back in the United States, however, millions of soldiers had 
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mobilized for war and preparations were underway to cross the Atlantic.  Hundreds of thousands 
passed through one of the principal barracks in the country at the time, Camp Fulston, Kansas 
(Trilla 669).  Some at the base came down with a strange sickness that seemed to progress with 
surprising tenacity, but the looming troop departures that summer into fall quickly overshadowed 
the then-insignificant malady.  
 In Europe, the first cases of what has since become known as the Spanish Flu appeared in 
both belligerent and neutral states, passing through army encampments and civilian settlements 
alike.  There were three waves of the H1N1 flu strand which made its way first through Europe 
and then through the rest of the world, reaching every continent (Barry 87).  Historians debate 
the origins of the flu and the chronology of its spread, but one thing remains free of doubt: the 
virus reached the far-flung corners of the world not by coincidence, but by the great movement 
of people that World War I had created (Beiner 502).  Before the Spanish Flu struck war-torn 
Europe and ravaged an unprepared world, author John Barry, recognized by the U.S. National 
Academies of Science for his reporting on the deadly influenza pandemic, wrote that “never had 
there been a time so exciting in medicine.” (Barry 28).  But as the death toll climbed 
precipitously to as much as ten times the mortality estimates for the war—or as many as 100 
million people (Echeverri 175)—the practitioners and scientists of the day rapidly became, in the 
eyes of historian Alfred Crosby, “participants in the greatest failure of medical science in the 
twentieth century or, if absolute numbers of dead are the measure, of all time.” (Crosby 10).  
This appalling loss of human life witnessed in the Spanish Flu pandemic, just as it has been with 
every major pandemic scenario, has been the result of increased human contact with populations, 
animals, and areas that they might not otherwise have come into contact with—a phenomenon in 
the post-modern age that we have termed ‘globalization.’           
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DISEASE AND MODERN GLOBALIZATION  
 Given the hyper-connectedness of 21st century globalization, any given zoonotic 
transmission scenario could quickly become a worldwide pandemic.  In revisiting the earlier 
discussion of Yersina pestis, the plague did not simply disappear from human society following 
the calamities of the 15th century in Western Europe and Asia.  In 1855, plague again appeared in 
Asia, on the border between China and India, and it “took only a few years to reach every 
continent” (Echenberg 431).  This pandemic, known uncreatively as ‘The Third Pandemic,’ 
demonstrated the accelerating rate of global interconnectedness.  Where other outbreaks of the 
plague in earlier time periods had been confined to relatively limited geographic areas in Europe, 
Africa, and Asia, the Third Pandemic reached a global scale in a short duration, thanks, in large 
part, to increasing global connectivity.  The other part of the equation that ensured the sustained 
global spread of the pandemic well until the 1950s was human interaction with the environment.  
“Indeed,” writes Echenberg, professor emeritus at McGill University, “all cities visited by plague 
between 1894 and 1901 had been transformed by the forces of industrialization, world trade 
expansion, and immigration” (Echenberg 433).  This echoes the assertions by Garrett, Quammen, 
and Barnes which contend that ever-changing human interaction with our environments has 
created a situation of intensified contact with infectious microbes.  With modern air 
transportation—termed by Laurie Garrett as “the great globalization of humanity” (Garrett 
569)—a previously rare and geographically-isolated disease could, therefore, depending on its 
incubation period, reach a global scale in a matter of hours to days.  David Quammen and Irwin 
Sherman both allude to amplifier hosts in the process of zoonotic disease transmission.  
Quammen clarifies what he means by an amplifier:  
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It is a creature in which a virus or other pathogen replicates—and from which it spews—
with extraordinary abundance…the amplifier host becomes an intermediate link between 
a reservoir…and some other sort of victim. (Quammen 36) 
These amplifiers have made diseases such as the Spanish Flu in 1918 to modern day Swine and 
Bird Flu possible.  An infectious pathogen, living inside a certain species of animal and makes its 
way to another animal, by which it mutates—or amplifies—and becomes pathologic to humans.  
These amplifiers are biological in nature, yet offer a curious parallel to what might be termed 
‘phenomenological amplifiers.’  These amplifiers are factors that have facilitated, accelerated, or 
amplified the effects of globalization—in Garrett’s eyes, for example, air transportation would be 
the prime example.  Other types of high-speed travel, communication, and various types of 
technological innovation may also be considered part of this amplifying effect.  This effect has 
increased global interconnectedness such that our awareness of globality has similarly increased 
acutely, which perhaps accounts for the flawed perspective held by social scientists and other 
authors that globalization is new.  What such amplifiers have done, nevertheless, is exponentially 
intensify the “time-space compression” (Eriksen 35) of modern globalization, creating the 
illusion that such impressive shrinkage of the world must be a new phenomenon. Yet, as Laurie 
Garrett ultimately concludes, in the 21st century, “we live in a globalized world, filled with 
shared microbial threats that arise in one place [and] are amplified somewhere else through 
human activities that aid and abet the germ” (Garrett 22).  This “globalized world” to which she 
makes reference has, nevertheless, risen out of social and historical precedent dating back 
millennia.     
 Between the destructive pandemics that gained notoriety in human history, there have 
been many other maladies that human populations have endured in silence in the endemic 
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regions of the planet.  These are the diseases that, unlike viruses like Ebola, have become 
endemic among human societies.  Centuries after the fall of Rome, “epidemic diseases that had 
once haunted the Roman Empire…became endemic to most of Europe” (Barnes 270).  Malaria 
was one such disease; once confined to regions in Africa, Malaria continually spread through the 
circulatory system of growing intercontinental trade until, in the 21st century, the malaria-causing 
Plasmodium parasites have reached pandemic status and now the blood disease covers endemic 
areas that span half the globe (Skolnik 256).  Malaria continues to kill 1 million people annually 
(Skolnik 256), and climate change, according to the World Health Organization, is projected to 
broaden the geographic distribution of the disease (Githeko et al. 1142).  In the 1940s, the 
spraying of DDT in endemic regions drastically reduced the spread of the disease, but after DDT 
use was banned, the incidence of malarial infections worldwide again grew; of further concern is 
that “chloroquine, fansidar, and mefloquine,” typical drugs used in the treatment of malaria, now 
“face growing levels of drug resistance” (Skolnik 256).  The resurgence of the mosquito 
population after chemical suppression in the mid-20th century and the biological adaptation of 
drug resistance among malarial parasites demonstrates that disease is and always has been 
global, indicating that, as a phenomenon, it is a central component of the human experience.   
  
CONCLUSION  
 Humanity has been well-trained in the exercise of dealing with disease.  Even “the 
plagues of the later Middle Ages” (Harrison 16)—occurring during a time when Europe was in 
the first throes of a “pandemic” (Aberth 19) scenario not seen since the Plague of Justinian—
were simply “the latest episodes in a process which had been underway, albeit intermittently, for 
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millennia” (Harrison 16).  This interpretation suggests that the concept of globalization, as a 
consciousness of interconnectedness, was not new to humanity when trade allowed nations to 
explore the benefits of a young, globalizing world in the mid-14th century, yet nor was it new 
even before that, in the time of the Peloponnesian Wars or during any point in human history.  
The global, or perceived-global spread of infectious disease offers strong evidence that 
globalization—as a phenomenon that we consciously experience—is not new in human society. 
Even as far back as 430BC, Thucydides of Ancient Greece was perhaps the first, but certainly not 
the last, to recognize the global scale of disease.  Although his assessment of the Athenian 
Plague as being “worldwide” might be slightly hyperbolic (just as the other witnesses to plague 
epidemics were) given a modern understanding of geography, the key takeaway is not in a literal 
interpretation of the word, but, rather, that the spread of the plague—like any other human 
disease—could only be as globalized as known civilization.   
 Human disease is linked to our interactions with the environment.  In the case of the 
Black Plague, the rodents that carried the infectious fleas “took advantage of human intrusions 
into their territory…and as the number of human intrusions increased, rats adapted to people and 
followed them to other locations” (Barnes 239).  The adaptive behavior of the wild rodent 
populations, nevertheless, attests to the versatility of nature—not simply microorganisms—in 
adjusting to environmental change.  More recently, “developmental activities, expansion of 
agriculture, and deforestation have the potential,” notes Barry Youngerman, “for increasing 
anopheline mosquito breeding sites” (Youngerman 187), which is the species of mosquito 
responsible for spreading tropical diseases such as malaria or lymphatic filariasis.  These 
diseases originated in Africa but “came to Europe…because of closer contact between Europeans 
and the people of Asia Minor” (Sherman 132).  Mark Harrison, echoing these authors, similarly 
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emphasizes the “important factor” in narratives of global disease as being related to 
“environmental change” (Harrison 20); then, referencing the 1700s “London physician Richard 
Mead,” Harrison points out that the doctor spoke with wisdom beyond his time when he blamed 
the growth of civilization and commerce for the spread of disease (Harrison 21).  Laurie Garrett, 
though slightly more sensationalist in her provocative claims, asserts similarly that, during the 
1980s, virologists examining the novel HIV/AIDS epidemic noted that urbanization and other 
increased human activity had created environmental conditions “from which ‘virtually anything 
might arise’; rain forests were being destroyed, forcing disease-carrying animals and insects into 
areas of human habitation” and the “lethal, mysterious microbes” which they carried with them 
had the potential, feared some scientists at the time, to “imperil the survival of the human race” 
(Garrett 6).  David Quammen concurs with and nicely summarizes the positions expressed by the 
other authors: that modern globalization and “mankind’s activities are causing the 
disintegration…of natural ecosystems at a cataclysmic rate” (Quammen 40).  What is of crucial 
importance in this excerpt from Quammen’s work is his emphasis on the ‘rate’ with which this 
change is occurring.  Author Manfred Steger notes that the changes in globalization’s pace over 
the course of history provide us with “a good sense that globalization is as old as humanity 
itself” (Steger 19).  The acceleration of modern globalization, to which Steger—among others—
makes reference, is a key facet to the phenomenon and has become a driving force in the 
geographic dissemination of disease since the origins of humanity.  Acceleration, as noted, is the 
phenomenological amplifier for disease propagation on a global scale and, given that “microbes 
no longer remain…confined to remote ecosphere or rare reservoir species” (Garrett 571), rapid 
distribution of harmful disease across the globe could have damaging and enduring consequences 
for humankind.  Importantly, therefore, contagion could not occur without the expansion of 
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human populations into new geographic areas or without contact between other societies and 
individuals.  Just as “the history of disease, of course, is very old” (Aberth 2) so too is the history 
of globalization—the two are nearly synonymous.  The first global phenomenon, therefore, was 
not economic, political, social, or cultural—it was biological.  Thus, globalization did not begin 
with the advent of modern communication, nor was it borne from interconnectedness facilitated 
by improved global transportation or the collapse of the Berlin Wall; it began, instead, with 
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